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RIDDThE YIEW aJRVE: REFiISE
Weinvestigate the efficacy of riding the yieldcurve. This strategy
dictates holding longer-term treasury billswhen the yield curve is upward-
sloping. We find that the strategy is surprisinglyeffective. it
stochastically dominates buying and holding shorter-term billsfor large
subperiods, and nearly dominates for the entiresample period, 1949 —1988.
Our empirical results suggest that abnormalprofit opportunities are
available from selectively increasing thematurity of a short-term
portfolio.
Rctiri Grieves






thesthutHill,MA02167RIDING THE YIELD CURVE: REPRISE
Riding the yield curve is a strategy ofbuying longer-dated
bills when the yield curve is
upward-sloping and selling them prior
to maturity in the hope or expectation of
collecting any term
premium that may exist. For example, three
ways of holding money
for the next 30 days would be: (1)buy a 30-day bill and allow it
to mature; (2) buy a 60-day bill and sellit as a 30-day bill 30
days hence; or (3) buy a 90—day bill and sellit as a 60-day bill 30
days hence. Choices (2) and (3) are"riding the yield curve."
While the practitioner literature
(e.g., Stigum, 1983) cites
this strategy as a common means ofenhancing returns, it is by no
means obvious that such a strategyought to be pursued. First, if
the expectations hypothesis is valid,riding the yield curve should
not improve returns. If thestrategy is pursued because the yield
curve is upward-sloping, then interestrates should, on average.
rise by just enough to equalizeholding period returns on all
bills. Alternatively, if there isa risk—related term premium,
riding the yield curve should simultaneouslyincrease both risk and
return. In principle, this strategyought not improve the
risk-reward profile (nor shouldany costless_to_compute rule enhance
performance). Righer-sloped yield curvesought to reflect some
combination of increasing expected interestrates and increased
interest—rate risk.
Nevertheless, Dyl and Joehnic (1981) providepositive evidence
on the efficacy of riding the yieldcurve. Using data for the1970-75 period, they find that (1) riding the yieldcurve gives a
small boost to average return without an appreciableincrease in
risk relative to buying and holding shorter-term bills,(2) that
longer-dated bills are better than shorter-dated bills atproviding
those returns, and (3) that a simple filter rulecan enhance the
risk-reward profile of the riding strategy. The filterallows one
to ride the yield curve only when the curve hasa positive slope
greater than some critical threshold. These resultssuggest a
useful trading rule, but in view of theextremely short sample
period, must be considered only indicative. Sincethe Dyl and
Joehnk study, more extensive data sets havebecome available, and
allow for more definitive testing.
In this paper, we utilize arecently available data set to
examine the efficacy of riding the yieldcurve for the period
1949—1988. Our data also provide evidenceof abnormal profit
opportunities. Riding the yield curve at somematurities appears to
increase average returns with noappreciable increase in risk. The
yield pickup, moreover, is well inexcess of transaction costs. Our
most striking result is that in severalsubperiods (e.g., the past
10 years or the past 20 years) thesample distribution of returns
from riding the yield curvestochastical].y dominates the
distribution from the buy—and-holdstrategy. Although the full
1949-1988 sample does not quite yield stochasticdominance, a
relative risk aversion parameterexceeding 260 would be necessary
for an investor to prefer the buy-and-holdshort-term bill
distribution to that of the ride. In contrast,estimates in
2financial research place the typical investorsrisk aversion
parameter below 2.0. (See for example, Friendand Blume (1974) or
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989).)
In Section 1 of this paper, webriefly discuss our data and
their reliability. In Section 2we explain and motivate thetrading
rules to be tested. Section 3presents results on the investment
performance of riding the yield curve.In Section 4, we Conclude
and discuss the implications ofour results.
1.
Ourdata come from Coleman, Fisher,and Ibboto (1989), Table
9-4, Estimated Zero-Coupon prices.Coleman, Fisher. and Ibbotson
used prices of Treasury securities fromthe CRSP tape to estimate a
forward interest_rate function.,1Those forward rates ware
aggregated into zero-coupon yields, which inturn gave zero—coupon
prices. Therefore, while their pricesare not taken from direct
observations of zero—coupon securities,they are consistent with
prices that were (for the most part)available for transactions.
These data differ from Dyl andJoehnk, who collected bid and
ask prices from the fl StreetJournpl once a week on the 26
regular T-bill issues outstanding. From thatrich data set, they
were able to compute
holding period returns for several
alternative strategies. In addition,because those prices were
effective until noon the next day, theirresults reflect
transactions that could have beenexecuted.
Although one Obviously would prefer touse firm dealer quotes
to simulate trading strategies, Colemanet al. report that it is no
3longer possible to gather Treasury prices whichnecessarily reflect
transaction possibilities. As of 1980, interest rateshad become so
volatile that the dealer quotation sheets used by CRSPcontained
only indicative prices on Treasury securities instead of available
transaction prices. Therefore, it would be impossibleto replicate
exactly Dyl and Joehnk's research beyond 1979. Moreover,Coleman,
Fisher, and Ibbotson (1987) found that the askprices supplied to
CRSP became unreliable after 1979.2 Therefore,their zero-coupon
prices are based on the average of bid and ask pricesthrough 1979
and bid prices alone thereafter.
We utilized their end-of-month prices forthree-month,
six-month, nine-month, and twelve-monthzero-coupon bonds. While
these prices were not necessarily available fortransactions, there
is no reason to suspect that the estimationtechnique introduces
systematic bias in comparisons of returns to thestrategies we
investigate. To the extent that theirzero—coupon prices are biased
(for example, by use of only bid prices),returns will not be
affected since the return on azero—coupon security is measured by
P1/P0, implying that numerator and denominator bias willcancel in
the calculation of returns.3 While randomprice errors can cause
biases in returns via a Jensen'sInequality effect, we show in the
Appendix that in this application, such bias islikely to be of
negligible magnitude, less than a tenth of a basispoint per quarter.
42. TUODOLOGr
Weexamine non-overlapping three-monthreturns to two competing
strategies. The benchjytar strategy is tobuy and hold three-month
bills.4 The alternativestrategy is to ride the yield curveby
holding longer-maturity bills and rolling themover every three
months. In most of our simulations,
we only ride the yield curve
conditional on a filter. If the filterrule is not satisfied. we
place our funds for that quarter inthree-month bills.
filter Rule
To illustrate the filter ruleused by Dyl and Joehnk, consider
a riding strategy using 12-month bills.Because a 12-month bill
will have a 9-month maturity in
three months, one can calculate the
three—month holding period returnon the bill as a function of the
end-of-period yield on 9-month bills. It is
then straightforward to
determine the amount by which the9-month yield must rise from its
current level before the holdingperiod return on the 12-month bill
is driven below that availableon the 3-month bill. If this
increase in the 9-month yieldexceeds a critical value called the
margin of safety, the ride strategy ispursued. Otherwise, one buys
and holds three—month bills.
Using a margin of safety of zero, one
will ride the Curve whenever
12-month yields exceed 3-month yields
and the yield Curve is nothumped. This is the usual specification
of the riding strategy. Forhigher margins of safety, the yield
curve must be steeper before riding ispursued. While one should be
5skeptical of a trading rule based on costless information, we
consider the filter because of its apparent success in Dyl and
Joehnk's work.
Dyl and Joehnk show that the breakeven end-of-period yield that




R0(n) =thediscount yield today on bills with maturity n
months
M =maturityof the bill ridden (12 months in our example)
H =holdingperiod (3 months in our example)
Therefore, the margin of safety (MOS) for riding a bill ofcurrent
maturity H is the percentage difference in R*(M_H) andR0(M-H).
R*(M_H) -R0(M-H) MOS =
R0(M-H) (1)
We examine in the next section the results of investmentpolicies
using MOS =-1.0(always hold the longer maturity bill), 0 (the
usual strategy of riding the yield curve when thelong rate
exceeds the short rate), and 0.025 (a version of theDyl and
Joehnk filter). We consider rides on 6-month, 9-month,and
12-month maturity bills.
6Transaction Costs
Before proceeding, however, we note that the ridingstrategy
entails greater transaction costs than the buy-and-holdstrategy,
since the longer-term bills must be sold at the bid price at the
end of the holding period. The bid-ask spread on 3-month bills
(where we will focus most of our attention) is virtually
always
below 6 basis points on a discount basis. Assuming thatthe
"true' bill price is midway between bid and ask prices, the
annualized transaction cost to a seller would be 3 basispoints.
Because maturity is one—fourth of a year, the cost is 0.75of a
basis point when the bill is sold after the 3-monthholding
period. Therefore, we reduce the calculated return eachquarter
on the riding strategy by 0.75 of a basis point in months thata
ride occurs to account for incremental trading costs.
(Transaction costs between 0.80 and 3.25 basis pointsare
considered below.)
3. RSULTS
Table 1 presents evidence on the efficacy of the MOS filter
for a 3—month holding period. For each MOS (-1, 0, 0.025),we
present in the panels labeled frequency" the fraction of quarters
in each subperiod in which riding the yield curve waspursued and
in the panels labeled "success" the percentage of those rides that
turned out to be profitable (i.e., provided returns in excess of
buy-and-hold). For exaniple, referring to the 1984-1988 panel, we
7see that with an MOS of 0, the investor would have ridden the
yield in 85 percent of the quarters in this 5-year period. Of
these rides, 65 percent would have resulted in returns in excess
of buying and holding 3-month bills, meaning 35 percent would have
resulted in opportunity losses relative to the buy-and-hold
strategy.
The screen seems at best weakly effective. While fewer rides
are pursued as the filter becomes more stringent, the success rate
of the rides pursued does not uniformly increase. Forexample,
looking at the bottom panel for the full period, the frequency of
riding 6—month bills falls from 100 percent to 69 percent as the
MOS rises from -1.0 to 0.025. The frequency of success increases
somewhat from 66 percent to 71 percent as MOS rises to 0, but then
falls back to 70 percent when MOS increases to 0.025.
Table 2 presents a different measure of the efficacy of
riding the curve. The top entry in each panel is the increment to
the average rate of return for the particular subperiod that
riding the yield curve provides over the buy-and-holdstrategy.
The bottom entry is the increment to the standard deviation of
holding period returns. All entries are in units of percentper
quarter. The table shows that riding the yield ':urve generally
increases both average return and intra—period vclatility. Of
more interest is the fact that average return is increased in
almost all five-year periods. The 6—month ride shows higher
average returns in all periods. This result suggests that riding
8the yield curve might be a beneficial strategy for investorswith
long horizons but with a desire to invest in the money market, for
example, investors placing portions of their retirement savings in
money-market accounts. The Dyl and Joehnk screen does notappear
to provide risk-free added value.5 The screen usually lowers
average return as well as risk, as it filters out progressively
more rides on the curve.
Tables 1 and 2 do not, in themselves, indicateany abnormal
performance from riding the yield curve. Indeed, they are broadly
consistent with a standard risk-return tradeoff. Howevera more
revealing view of riding the yield curve is provided in Figures 1
and 2. In Figure 1 we plot the cumulative sample distributionsof
full sample 3-month buy-and—hold returns and returns fromriding
the yield curve using 6-month maturity bills, a zeromargin of
safety, and 0.75 basis point transaction costs. Despite the
higher volatility of the riding strategy. Figure 1 shows that the
returns from riding whenever the yield curve slopes upward (MOS=
0)nearly stochastically dominates the buy-and-hold strategy. In
fact, the riding distribution would stochastically dominate6 the
buy-and-hold distribution except for the presence of the single
negative return to riding (which occurred in 1958, second
quarter). The two lines cross near the (0,0) point.
Figure 2 presents sample return distributions again with MOS
=0,3-month holding periods, rides using 6-month maturity bills
and transaction costs of 0.75 basis points for the most recent
920-year subperiod 1969-1988. Stochastic dominance by the riding
strategy in this period is complete.
The 6-month rides using MOS of 0.025 also stochastically
dominated the buy-and-hold strategy except for the one crossover
in 1958. Because of the similarity of results, the figure is not
presented. The always-ride strategy (MOS =-1.0)did not fare as
well. There were several cross-overs in the sample return
distributions. Rides using maturities other than 6 months are
considered below.
Of course, we know a priori that the true population
distribution of returns to riding cannot stochastically dominate
that of buying and holding, because only the ridingstrategy poses
a possibility of negative returns. Nevertheless, the dominance of
ridings sample distribution over such extended periods of time
encompassing different interest—rate regimes is striking, and is
highly suggestive of historically abnormal returns to theriding
strategy. Certainly for these substantial subperiods, riding has
provided abnormal risk-adjusted returns.
It also is worth acknowledging again that these resultsmust
be interpreted in the context of an investment horizon.For a
three-month horizon, the three-month bill is riskless,and it
makes no sense to talk about the probability distributionof its
returns. However, a long-horizon investor whocompares the
alternative strategies of rolling three-monthversus six-month
bills each quarter would be interested in theempirical results
10presented in the Figures. as these would definitively recornnend
the riding strategy.
Although the returns distribution over the entire 1949-1988
period do not exhibit stochastic dominance, riding the yield curve
still has offered risk-return attributes far superior to the
buy-and-hold alternative. An investor with a constant relative
risk-aversion utility function would need a risk-aversion
parameter exceeding 260 before he or she would avoid riding
6-month bills (with a zero margin of safety) in favor of buying
and holding. In contrast, the mean excess return and volatility
of the S&P 500 index over Treasury bills have been consistent with
a risk-aversion parameter of about two.7
These results may be sensitive to the assumed level of
transaction costs. To measure the historic advantage of the
6-month riding strategy over buy-and-hold, we calculate the
relative risk aversion parameter for which the tw strategies are
equally attractive under other assumptions for transaction costs.
Table 3 presents the risk aversion parameter which equates the
expected utility of each strategy for several levels of
transaction costs in excess of the already—posited 0.75 basis
point per quarter (which corresponds to a reported bid-ask spread
of 6.0 basis points). Expected utility is computed using the
sample distribution of returns to each strategy over the full
1949—1988 sample period.
11tJtility falls off rapidly with transaction costs. However,
increasing transaction costs by 2.5 basis points from the assumed
value of 0.75 basis points (consistent with a bid-ask spread on
three—month bills of 26 basis points!) still leaves riding the
yield curve as a preferable strategy for risk aversion
coefficients below 10. Thus, it appears that fot any reasonable
specification of risk aversion and transaction costs, riding the
yield curve using 6-month bills presents a return distribution
superior to that of buying and holding three-month bills. If
transaction costs are about 0.75 basis points, as we haveargued,
then riding the yield curve has provided abnormal risk-adjusted
returns in excess of 2.5 basis points per quarter or 10 basis
points per year. (Gross return differences——not adjusted for
risk—- were closer to 10 basis pointsper quarter. See Table 2,
bottom panel, which shows average incremental returnsper quarter
over the whole sample.)
MOS filters above zero would have destroyed value insteadof
creating value. We see this by comparing columns MOS =0and
MOS =0.025in Table 3.For every level of transactions costs in
excess of 0.75 basis points, the risk aversion parameter that
would leave an investor indifferent between buying andholding and
riding the yield curve is lower with the higher screen. This
implies that for any given level of risk aversion, investorswould
prefer returns from the zero screen strategy to returns froman
MOS =0.025screen.
12Rides using longer maturities than six months did not perform
as well as the six-month rides. Figure 3 for example, provides
full-sample distributions for nine-month rides versus buy-and-hold
distributions for MOS of 0.0. While longer—term riding
distributions also lie generally to the right of the buy—and-hold
distribution, when riding longer-maturity bills fails, as in 1958
second quarter, long-term riding fares much more poorly than the
6—month ride because duration is higher, giving rise to a longer
left-hand tail. These results, together with Table 2, suggest
that the extra average return to riding beyond maturities of six
months increases risk by too much to qualify as a dominant
strategy.
Finally, we ask whether riding the yield curve is an
effective strategy for holding periods other than three months.
In Figure 4, we present return distributions for 6—month
buy-and-hold versus 6-month rollovers of 12-month bills for MOS of
0.0. Clearly, the riding strategy is not dominant.
4. CONCLUSION
We have found that riding the yield curve using six-month
maturity zeros has been an extraordinarily effective strategy
versus rolling over three-month zeros. Riding the yield curve
using longer maturity bills for three-month holding periods also
outperforms the simple buy-and-hold strategy, but does not
incrementally enhance performance versus use of the 6-month
bills. In fact, such longer rides perform slightly worse due to
13increased interest-rate risk. Similarly, riding the yield curve
using 12-month bills and 6-month holding periods does not offer a
risk-reward profile arguably better than that obtainable from
buying and holding 6-month bills.
These results are suggestive of some market segmentation for
maturities on either side of 3 months, in that it appears that
profitable trading strategies straddling this maturity have gone
unexploited. Possibly, maturities less than 3 months are viewed
as more liquid and better cash substitutes than longer maturity
instruments, even beyond a simple duration effect. In this case,
the apparent abnormal performance of longer maturity bills may be
viewed as the price of this liquidity attribute. However, this
interpretation suggests that modelling prices as solely a function
of risk and return attributes is too narrow a view of the market.
14kPPENDIX
The actual rate of return, r, realized by a trader is
defined by 1 +r=P1/P0,where P0 denotes the price at which the
zero—coupon security is purchased, and i is the price at which it
is sold. We, however, measure prices with error, in part because
of unobserved bid—ask spreads, and in part because of statistical
error in the fitting of the yield curve. We therefore measure r
with error. If r* is the measured return, then
P +e l+r =1 1 (A.l)
P0 +e0




1+ r= 1 + 1 (A.2)
+ e0P0 +e0,
it is clear that measurement error in P1 will not bias returns as
long as e1 and e0 are independent, since in this case the second
term in (A.2) has zero expectation. However, the first term will
not provide an unbiased estimate of 1 +r.To see this, expand
the first term around P0 in a second-order Taylor series:




15Taking expectations over e0, the expected value of the measured




Thus, returns will be biased upward by the square of the standard
deviation of measurement error expressed as a fraction of the
security price.
This bias, however, should be exceedingly small. As noted
above, the bid-ask spread is less than 6 basis points annualized,
or 3 basis points on a 6-month bill. Moreover, Coleman et al.
(1989, Table 10—3) present standard errors of their
cross—sectional forward rate curves for each maturity class.
Their results imply that for maturities less than one year, the
standard error of the implied bill prices is in most cross
sections considerably less than 0.25 percent. Together, these
data imply that the total value of (e0) would be less than 30
basis points, or 0.3 percent of price. If a typical 6-month
return is 3 percent, the bias would be determined by
E(l +r*)=(l.03)(1+0.0032)
=1.030009
16implying a negligible bias of 0.09 basis points. Even if the
standard deviation of the measurement error in price is 0.50
percent, a huge amount in the money market, the bias still would




Colemanet al. assume that forward rates are constant over
certain time intervals and then use a nonlinear least
squares technique to find the sequence of forward rates
that best fit the prices of all Treasury securities. They
obtain their best fit for short—term securities by allowing
the forward rates to change with maturity fairly frequently
at the short end of the term structure. In fact, the first
five weeks are fit exactly, because they allow different
forward rates for each of the first five weeks. The time
interval over which the forward rate is assumed constant is
short for all maturities less than one year, which means
that the inferred prices should be quite accurate for the
securities we examine in this paper. The exact scheme for
inferring forward rates is as follows:
Period Span Period
1. week 1 7 days 8. 3—6 months92 days
2. week 2 7 days 9. 6—12 mos. 6 months
3. week 3 7 days 10. 1—2 years 1 year
4. week 4 7 days 11. 2—4 years 2 years
5. week 5 7 days 12. 4—8 years 4 years
6. 36-50 days 15 days 13. 8—16 years8 years
7. 51-90 days 40 days 14. 16-32 years 16 years
182. They report that whereas bid prices for T-bills reported in
the Wall Street Jouriiai. and CRSP are always close (they
differ slightly because the former is a 3:00 pm price and
the latter is a closing price), the ask prices in CRSP and
the Journal vary widely. Because the bid prices are
consistent while the ask prices in CRSP imply bid-ask
spreads as high as $2.00, Coleman, at al. chose to use only
bid prices from CRSP for dates after 1979.
3. The returns on investnents held to maturity will be biased
upward by the use of a bid price since in this case, the
numerator in the return calculation is exactly par value
(rather than a calculated quantity) while the denominator
is downward biased. However, this property only
strengthens our empirical conclusions below, in that we
find that riding the yield curve dominates the buy and hold
strategy even with the upward bias in buy and hold returns.
4. Strictly speaking, these are not three-month T-bills, but
three-month zero-coupon bonds priced based on the Treasury
yield curve. However, for expositional ease, we will
continue to refer to them as bills.
5. Because these filter rules worked for Dyl and Joehnk, we
would like to compare our results to theirs for the sample
period in which our data overlap. This, however, is not
possible. Our data set contains zero—coupon prices at
maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. Our rides must
19therefore be at 3-month increments. In contrast, Dyl and
Joehnk have bills with maturities staggered each week.
Their rides generally involve very small increments to the
maturity of the bill being held, and most of their tables
present returns from overlapping periods averaged across
rides of different maturities.
6. One investment stochastically dominates another if the
cumulative probability distribution of its returns lies
strictly to the right of the others. This means that the
dominating investment has a higher probability than the
dominated investment of beating any target return. All
risk—averse investors will prefer the investment with the
dominant distribution in a pairwise comparison (see
Ingersoll, 1987).
7. We follow Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989). The historical
average risk premium and standard deviation in the market
portfolio have been about 8.5 percent and 21 percent
respectively. In an CAPM-type model, where all investors
hold the market portfolio, the risk premium should equal
AcTM2 where A is the risk aversion parameter and aM2 is the
market variance. These values imply that A =0.085/0.212
1.93.
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Frequency =fractionof quarterswithinthesample period thatthe
investor chooses to ride the yield curve.
Success =fractionof rides that result in higher returns than
buying and holding 3-nonth T-bills.
22Table 2
INVESTMENTRESULTS FROM RIDING TEE YIELD CURVE:
INCREMENT TO AVERAGE QUARTERLY RETURN AND
STANDARD DEVIATION OVER BUY-AND-BOLD STRATEGY
ample
eriod MOS:
6-Momith bills 9-Month bills 12-Month bills


















































































































































RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENT ATWHICB RIDINGTHEYIELDCURVE
ISEQUALLY ATTRACTIVEAS BUYINGANDHOLDING
Transaction
Cost(bp)* MOSs -1.0 0 .025
6.0 224.4 260.1 251.0
10.0 206.6 237.4 227.1
14.0 172.9 196.1 183.3
18.9 127.2 143.7 126.6
22.0 75.0 87.9 64.8
26.0 28.8 36.2 9.9
* Reportedbid-ask spread.
24F
H
U
H
K
 
I
 
C
U
M
U
L
A
T
I
V
E
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
T
h
A
T
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
h
E
N
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
I
S
 
L
E
S
S
 
T
h
A
N
 
A
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
:
0
0
 
9
5
 
9
0
 
8
5
 
8
0
 
:
5
 
'
0
 
b
b
 
-
 
s
o
 
-
 
'
0
 
i
s
 
s
)
0
 
5
 
B
U
Y
 
A
N
D
 
H
O
L
D
 
,
-
 
-
J
 
0
 
R
I
D
E
 
M
O
s
 
=
 
0
 
S
A
M
P
L
E
 
1
9
9
—
1
9
8
8
 
R
I
D
E
 
6
—
M
O
N
T
H
 
B
I
L
L
S
 
O
.
0
 
0
.
0
0
 
0
 
-
.
 
0
.
0
1
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
0
.
 
0
)
 
C
'
 
C
 
o
.
0
 F
I
G
U
R
I
 
2
 
C
U
M
U
L
A
T
I
V
E
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
T
H
A
T
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
H
E
N
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
I
S
 
L
E
S
S
 
f
u
J
i
 
A
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
1
0
0
 
-
i
 
I
 
9
0
 
1
 
8
5
 
8
0
 
7
5
 
7
0
 
6
5
 
6
0
 
5
5
 
5
0
 
4
5
 
-
 
4
O
.
j
 
i
s
 
-
 
3
0
 
-
 
2
5
 
2
0
 
1
0
 
i
i
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
B
U
Y
 
A
N
D
 
H
O
L
D
 
/
 
-
J
 
0
 
—
 
M
O
S
 
0
 
S
A
M
P
L
E
 
1
9
6
9
-
1
9
8
8
 
R
I
D
E
 
6
—
M
O
N
T
H
 
B
I
L
L
S
 
I
 
I
 
-
 
0
.
0
4
1
 
0
.
0
4
9
 
0
.
0
5
4
 
0
,
0
0
9
 
0
.
0
1
4
 
I
 
I
 
r
 
0
.
0
1
9
 
0
.
 
0
2
4
 
0
.
0
2
9
 
0
.
0
3
4
 
0
.
0
3
9
 F
I
G
U
H
K
 
3
 
C
L
N
J
L
A
T
I
V
E
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
1
H
A
T
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
I
S
 
L
E
S
S
 
T
H
A
N
 
A
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
9
0
 
-
-
 
8
5
 
8
0
-
 
7
5
 
7
0
 
6
5
 
6
0
1
 
5
5
:
1
 
s
o
j
 
o
4
5
.
 
'
 
4
0
 
I
 
1
 
2
5
 
-
 
2
0
 
-
 
1
5
-
,
 
1
0
 
-
 
0
 
1
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
H
E
U
F
N
 
1
0
0
 
9
5
 
-
 
B
U
Y
 
A
N
D
 
H
O
L
D
 
r
 
D
E
 
M
O
S
 
=
 
0
 
S
A
M
P
L
E
 
!
9
1
1
9
_
1
9
8
8
 
R
I
D
E
 
9
—
M
O
N
T
H
 
B
I
L
L
S
 
I
l
l
 
I
I
I
 
I
I
 
T
i
 
1
1
1
t
 
T
I
 
T
I
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
r
i
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
u
l
l
i
l
u
t
l
I
.
 
-
0
.
0
1
 
0
.
0
0
 
0
.
0
1
 
0
,
0
2
 
0
.
0
.
3
 
0
.
O
'
I
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
6
 V
W
U
H
E
 
I
 
C
I
P
I
U
L
A
T
I
V
E
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
T
H
A
T
 
A
C
T
U
A
L
 
I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
I
S
 
L
E
S
S
 
T
H
A
N
 
A
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 
C
U
M
P
C
T
 
1
O
0
:
 
9
0
-
i
 
8
5
 
8
0
 
7
5
 
B
U
Y
 
A
N
D
 
H
O
L
D
 
7
0
 
6
5
 
-
 
-
1
 
6
0
 
"
,
J
R
I
D
E
 
5
5
-
1
 
7
 
5
O
 
4
5
J
 
(
l
i
t
 
7
1
 
M
o
s
O
 
i
s
 
-
 
S
A
M
P
L
E
 
1
9
4
9
-
1
9
8
8
 
2
5
 
R
I
D
E
 
1
2
—
M
O
N
T
H
 
B
I
L
L
S
 
F
O
R
 
6
 
M
O
N
T
H
S
 
2
0
 
1
 
1
5
 
-
 
S
i
 
'
I
 
1
 
'
 
I
 
1
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
'
 
0
.
0
0
 
0
.
0
1
 
0
.
0
2
 
0
,
O
J
 
0
.
0
4
 
0
.
0
5
 
0
.
0
6
 
0
.
0
7
 
0
,
0
8
 
0
.
0
9
 
T
A
R
G
E
T
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
 